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I.

SEPARATE

MAINTENANCE

The case of Folk v. Folk' dealt with a long-continued domestic
dispute in which the husband sought unsuccessfully to terminate a
separate maintenance decree. The litigation had begun in 1954 as a
divorce suit by the wife. Although her prayer for divorce had been
denied, she had been allowed separate maintenance from her husband
because of his mistreatment of her. The chancellor in that action
had provided that the separate maintenance payments should continue unless the wife should unreasonably reject a sincere attempt at
reconciliation by the husband. The court of appeals had stricken this
portion of the decree but had held that if the husband should seek
to discontinue the payments in the future, the chancellor should consider his petition in the light of all of the circumstances at that time.
This opinion of the court of appeals was rendered in April 1958.
Within a short time after this decision the husband began writing
letters to his wife, speaking in general terms of reconciliation. Some
sixteen of these letters were introduced in the present case. It did
not appear, however, that the husband took any other action toward
effecting a reconciliation. In November 1959 he filed the present
petition to terminate the separate maintenance award on the ground
that the wife had refused repeated invitations on his part to resume
their marriage. The chancellor held that the proof was insufficient to
show a bona fide effort at reconciliation on his part or an arbitrary
refusal by the wife. The court of appeals, in a divided opinion, reversed and ordered the payments terminated within three months
whether a reconciliation had occurred or not.
*Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Trabue, Minick, Sturdivant &
Harbison, Nashville, Tennessee.
1. 355 S.W.2d 634 (Tenn. 1962).
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The supreme court reversed and reinstated the decree of the chancellor. The court pointed out that an action for separate maintenance
is independent of the divorce statutes and lies when the husband has
failed in his obligation to support his wife.2 Such an award is not a
mere temporary or interlocutory decree; it remains in force indefinitely unless there is sufficient change in the circumstances of the
parties to justify a modification of the terms of the decree. Normally
an unjustified refusal by the wife of a bona fide offer of reconciliation
will justify termination of the award.3 It is well settled, however, that
a mere token effort at reconciliation or an offer made merely for the
purpose of terminating an award or to put the other party technically
at fault will not suffice. 4 Finding that the evidence did not preponderate against the chancellor's findings of fact, the supreme court
held that the husband's attempts at reconciliation in the present case
were not sufficient to justify a termination of the separate maintenance award.
II. DIVoRcE

A. Residence Requirement
The one-year residence requirement in divorce cases where the
cause of action arose out of state or the petitioner resided out of
state5 was considered in the case of Snodgrass v. Snodgrass.6 The
husband was a native of North Carolina, but since 1956 he
had been employed in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. He traveled
extensively in his work but maintained a residence in Oak Ridge. In
the latter part of 1958 he was married in Oak Ridge; after the marriage the wife resided with her mother in Asheville, North Carolina.
The husband alleged that his wife refused to come to Tennessee to
live with him, and in 1960 he sued for and obtained a divorce in
Tennessee. Substituted service of process was had on the wife, who
did not appear or contest the action.
The wife subsequently filed the present suit to set aside the decree
on the ground that the Tennessee court lacked jurisdiction to grant
the divorce because of the residence requirement. She alleged that
her husband had not been a bona fide resident of the state for one
year prior to filing the divorce action. The trial court dismissed her
suit, and the court of appeals affirmed.
2. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 201 Tenn. 253, 257, 298 S.W.2d 717, 719 (1957).
3. Cureton v. Cureton, 117 Tenn. 103, 96 S.W. 608 (1906); 27 Amx. Jun. Husband
and Wife § 410 (1940).

4. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 37 Tenn. 554, 561 (1858); Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d
(1950).
5. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-803 (1956).
6. 49 Tenn. App. 607, 357 S.W.2d 829 (E.S. 1961).
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Pretermitting any question of res adjudicata because not relied
upon by the defendant, the court of appeals held the evidence sufficient to show that the husband had established his domicile in Tennessee long before filing the divorce suit. He had voted in Tennessee
in 1958 and in 1960, and since 1956 he had received his mail at his
Tennessee address. He apparently resided with his wife at Asheville
for short periods, but these brief stays did not cause him to lose his
Tennessee domicile. Since the one-year residence requirement was
held to be satisfied the husband was entitled in his divorce action to
rely upon
alleged misconduct of his wife which took place in another
7
state.
The purpose of the residence requirement is to prevent Tennessee
from becoming a center for foreign divorce cases. 8 The present holding seems consistent with that purpose. "Residence" as used in the
statute has been equated to "domicile, ' 9 and under the facts stated
in the opinion it seems clear that the husband had established his
domicile in Tennessee, possibly as early as 1956, and in all events no
later than 1958.
B. Pleading

In the Snodgrass case another ground for attack upon the
divorce proceedings was alleged deficiency in the divorce bill.
The suit apparently had been predicated upon mental cruelty, and the
Tennessee cases have held that allegations of cruelty must be specific
as to time and place. 10 Nevertheless, no more is required than to give
the defendant to a divorce bill notice of the charges required to be
answered." This is particularly true where a course of conduct over a
long period of time is involved as a basis for the action; a date and
place for each act need not be alleged in the pleading. 2 The husband
in the present case charged persistent and unjustified denial of marital
relations, general indifference, and refusal of the wife to make a home
for him. From the language quoted in the opinion, these charges
were clearly stated; and since the divorce action had been uncontested, the court of appeals evidenced a natural reluctance to set
aside a final judgment in a later independent proceeding, when any
7. Carter v. Carter, 113 Tenn. 509, 512, 82 S.W. 309 (1904).
8. Carter v. Carter, supra note 7.
9. Brown v. Brown, 150 Tenn. 89, 261 S.W. 959 (1923); Tyborowski v. Tyborowski, 28 Tenn. App. 583, 192 S.W.2d 231 (M.S. 1945).
10. Loy v. Loy, 25 Tenn. App. 99, 151 S.W.2d 178 (E.S. 1941); Stargel v. Stargel,
21 Tenn. App. 193, 107 StW.2d 520 (M.S. 1937).
11. Brown v. Brown, 159 Tenn. 551, 553, 20-S.W.2d 1037 (1929).
12. Garvey v. Garvey, 29 Tenn. App. 291, 203 S.W.2d 912 (En Bane 1946).
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question of3 inadequate pleading could have been made in the divorce
case itself.1
C. Attorneys' Fees

In the Folk separate maintenance case discussed above, 14 the
attorneys for the wife, having been successful in the supreme
court in having the decree of the court of appeals reversed and
the decree of the chancellor reinstated, sought an allowance
in the supreme court for additional fees for services rendered
in both appellate courts. The supreme court, however, in a supplemental opinion 5 remanded this question to the chancellor, stating that
since the entire cause had been remanded to the chancery court, that
was the proper forum for the fixing of fees. The court pointed out a
number of factors to be considered in connection with the fees, including the ability of the defendant to pay and the separate estate
and means of the wife, in addition to the actual services rendered.
In the Snodgrass case,16 which was not a divorce action but a suit
by a divorced wife against her former husband attacking the validity
of the divorce, attorneys' fees to the complainant were denied inasmuch as her suit was dismissed on its merits. This holding seems
proper since, in view of the decision sustaining the validity of the
divorce, there was no relationship between complainant and her
former husband which would obligate him to pay her counsel fees.' 7
Presumably, had she upset the divorce decree and reinstated a marital
relationship, her counsel fees for this service would be deemed a
necessary item for which the husband would be obligated.
D. Support of Children

In a carefully considered opinion, the court of appeals held that a
provision in a divorce decree for periodic support and future education of a child does not survive the death of the father unless there is
language in the decree expressly or impliedly providing for such
survival.' 8 This holding is consistent with earlier Tennessee cases on
the subject. 19 In the present case the father had been ordered to
make monthly payments to the mother for support of a minor child
and to provide a college education upon the child's graduation from
13. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 41 Tenn. App. 659, 298 S.W.2d 36 (E.S. 1956).
14. 355 S.W.2d 634 (Tenn. 1962).
15. 357 S.W.2d 828 (Tenn. 1962).
16. 357 S.W.2d 829 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
17. 17 Am. Jun. Divorce and Separation§ 639 (1957).
18. In re Estate of Kerby, 49 Tenn. App. 329, 354 S.W.2d 814 (M.S. 1961).
19. Brandon v. Brandon, 175 Tenn. 463, 135 S.W.2d 929 (1940) (alimony); In re
Moore's Estate, 34 Tenn. App. 131, 234 S.W.2d 847 (W.S. 1949) (child support).
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high school. At the time of the divorce the child was two years of
age. The father had been in ill health and died less than three years
after the divorce decree was entered. The court of appeals, reversing
the probate court, disallowed a claim against the father's estate for
future support and education of the child. There would be no doubt
of the power of a divorce court to make future support a charge upon
the father's estate, 2 but nothing in the decree evidenced such an
intention in this case.
In the case of Snodgrass v. Snodgrass,21 a divorced wife brought a
separate action against her former husband seeking to set aside the
divorce decree for lack of jurisdiction in the Tennessee courts. The
trial court in dismissing her suit declined to enter an order against
the father for future support of the child of the parties. On appeal
this action was affirmed, in view of the statutory provisions which
retain questions of future custody and support before the divorce
court.22 It was pointed out that the court which rendered the divorce
decree here sustained would therefore have full jurisdiction to pass
upon any question of future support.
E. Custody of Children
In the case of State ex rel. Seldon v. York,'3 the Tennessee courts
were once again called upon to consider the modification of a custody
award made in another state. That such jurisdiction exists is no
longer an open question when the child has been brought into Tennessee and when a sufficient change in circumstances is shown.2
In the present case sufficient change in circumstances was proved.
The parents were divorced in San Antonio, Texas, where both resided.
Weekly visitation privileges were given the father. Within a few
months, however, the mother remarried and moved with her new
husband and the child to Tennessee. The father filed the present
habeas corpus proceedings seeking to establish visitation privileges
consistent with the distance between his home and that of the child.
Overruling a plea to its jurisdiction, the trial court modified the Texas
decree so as to allow the father to have the child with him in Texas a
part of each summer and to visit her in Tennessee at certain times.
The court of appeals found this decree consistent with the welfare of
the child and affirmed.
A long and very bitter custody dispute was considered in Terry v.
20. In re Moore's Estate, 34 Tenn. App. 131, 234 S.W.2d 847 (W.S. 1949).
21. 357 S.W.2d 829 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
22. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-828 (1956).
23. 360 S.W.2d 931 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
24. Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S.W. 779 (1917); State ex tel. Sprague
v. Bucher, 38 Tenn. App. 40, 270 S.W.2d 565 (W.S. 1953).
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Terry.25 In previous divorce proceedings custody of two children had
been given to the mother with certain visitation rights in the father.
The father's visits, however, apparently created extreme friction and
perpetuated the hostility which had long existed between the two
parents. Both parents were found to be fit persons to have custody of
the children, but personal and religious differences between the two
parents rendered impossible an amicable solution to the custody problem. Upon a petition by the father to modify the custody provisions
of the divorce decree, the chancellor awarded the father custody of
one of the children, reduced the support payments required of the
father accordingly, and fixed visitation rights in the mother with the
child whose custody was given to the father. Because of her apparent
prejudice against him, the father was instructed not to visit the child
remaining with the mother. The court of appeals affirmed the decree
of the chancellor as being for the best interest of all concerned under
the circumstances shown.
25. 361 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).

